A recent string of theoretical papers highlights the importance of geographical distance in explaining pricing and availability of loans to small firms. Lenders located in the vicinity of small firms may have significantly lower monitoring and transaction costs, and hence considerable market power if competing financiers are located relatively far. We directly study the effect on loan conditions of the geographical distance between firms, the lending bank, and all other banks in the vicinity. For our study, we employ detailed contract information from more than 15,000 bank loans to small firms and control for relevant relationship, loan contract, firm, and regional characteristics. We report the first comprehensive evidence on the occurrence of spatial price discrimination in bank lending. Borrowing costs decrease in the distance between the firm and the lending bank and increase at the same rate in the distance between the firm and competing banks.
Introduction
Banks may derive market power ex post from private information they obtain about firms during the course of the lending relationship or ex ante from their relative physical proximity to the borrowing firms. Closer banks may have significantly lower costs of monitoring and transacting with small firms, such that "if other banks are relatively far, close banks have considerable market power" (Petersen and Rajan (1995) , p. 417).
We directly study the effect on loan conditions of the geographical distance between firms, the lending bank, and all other banks in the vicinity, controlling for relevant relationship, loan, bank branch, firm, and regional characteristics. For our study, we employ a unique data set containing detailed loan contract information (including firm and lender identities and addresses) from more than 15,000 bank loans to (predominantly) small firms as well as information on competing bank branches in the vicinity of the firm.
We find that, in line with predictions emanating from theory modeling spatial price discrimination, borrowing costs decrease in the distance between the firm and the lending bank.
We identify banking competition and pricing strategies in our analysis by including both the number of bank branches (or branch concentration) and the distance between the borrower and competing bank branches in the vicinity. We observe that increasing distance between the borrower and alternative lenders significantly relaxes price competition and results in substantially higher borrowing costs for the firm. Petersen and Rajan (2002) and Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan and Stein (2001) also study the correspondence between distance and lending conditions. Petersen and Rajan (2002) focus on the increasing distance and changing modes of communication between small firms and their lenders in the United States over the last 25 years. Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan and Stein (2001) document how large banks lend at a greater distance than small banks in the U.S. In contrast, we analyze contract terms of loans granted by a single bank and incorporate not only the distance between the borrowing firm and this lender, but also the distance between the firm and the competing banks in the vicinity to identify potential spatial price discrimination. We further document that the distance between the European firms and the bank in our study did not increase substantially over the period 1975-1997. Other empirical work reveals the impact of geographical distance on related activities of financial intermediaries, such as for example, cross-border bank lending (Berger, Dai, Ongena and Smith (2001) ; Buch (2001) ) and cross-border bank branching (Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou (1996) ; Grosse and Goldberg (1991) ). Distance also determines the effectiveness of internal control within bank holding companies (Berger and DeYoung (2001) ), the strength of informational contagion between banks (Aharony and Swary (1996) ), and the representation of venture capitalists on the boards of U.S. private firms (Lerner (1995) ).
Physical distance may influence activities on financial markets in general. International capital flows seem bound by geographical proximity (Portes and Rey (2001) ), but so are possibly the composition and returns on actively managed U.S. mutual funds (Coval and Moskowitz (2001) ), the trading profitability of traders on the German electronic exchange Xetra (Hau (2001)) and the portfolio choices of Finnish investors (Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) ). We contrib ute to this growing literature by analyzing the impact of both the lender-borrower and competing banksborrower distances on the pricing of bank loans.
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on distance, lending relationships, and competition. Section 3 introduces the data and discusses the methodology used in our paper. Section 4 displays the empirical results and contains a discussion of the results. Section 5 concludes.
Literature Review

Distance
Recent theoretical papers highlight the importance of distance in explaining the availability and pricing of bank loans. Lending conditions may depend on the distance between the borrower and the lender and the distance between the borrower and the closest competing bank (Table 1 summarizes the theoretical predictions).
In traditional location differentiation models (Hotelling (1929) , Salop (1979) ), borrowers incur transportation costs visiting their bank branch.
1 Total transportation costs naturally increase in distance. Banks price uniformly if they cannot observe borrower location or are prohibited to charge different prices to different borrowers. Borrowers pay the same interest rate but incur different transportation costs depending on their location vis-à-vis the lending bank.
However, if banks can observe the borrowers' location and offer interest rates based on that information, they may engage in spatial price discrimination. If borrowers incur their own transportation cost, a bank will charge a higher interest rate to those borrowers located closest to its branch (see for example, Lederer and Hurter (1986) ). Hence, discriminatory pricing based on transportation costs implies, for a given number of banks, a negative relationship between the loan rate and the borrower-lender distance and a similar, positive relationship between the loan rate and the distance between the borrower and the closest competing bank.
The cost of servicing a bank borrower may also be related to physical distance. For example, bank costs may increase in borrower-lender distance, because of extra communication costs or transportation costs incurred by banks visiting the borrowers' premises. Loan rates reflecting such costs will increase in distance. However, monitoring costs increasing in distance may also give rise to discriminatory pricing. For example, in Sussman and Zeira (1995) spatial price discrimination arises because all banks face monitoring costs increasing in distance, have a strong bargaining position, and extract all the gains of trade. Discrimination again implies a negative (positive) relationship between the loan rate and the borrower-lender (borrowerclosest competing bank) distance (for a given number of banks). The correspondence between borrower-lender distance and loan rate may become non-monotonic if monitoring costs are also dependent on loan size (Wong and Chan (1993) ).
Distance and Lender Information
Lenders may initially be unsure about the exact location of the borrower. For example, if the borrower maintains multiple centers of activity, it may not be clear at first for the bank where to monitor. In that case, the bank can only engage in discriminatory pricing upon becoming informed about the location and transportation costs faced by their borrowers. In Dell'Ariccia (2001), for example, banks become informed about the location of the borrower through first period lending. In his model, only "relationship" banks, lending in their second period, can engage in spatial price discrimination, while de novo "transactional" banks have to resort to "mill pricing".
The severity of the asymmetric information problem itself may also increase in distance. Hauswald and Marquez (2000) develop a model in which the precision of the signal about a borrower's quality received by a bank decreases in distance. Because banks will receive more precise signals about close borrowers, competing banks will face increasing adverse selection problems when approaching borrowers closer to the most informed bank. Hence, the informed relationship bank can charge higher interest rates to closer borrowers while the uninformed transactional banks will charge higher interest rates to borrowers located farther afield due to the increase in the adverse selection problem. Ceteris paribus, Hauswald and Marquez (2000) derive a negative (positive) relationship between the loan rate and the distance between the borrower and the relationship (transactional) bank.
Competition
The number of banks in the market is inversely related to the distance between the lender and the (closest) competing banks. An increase in the number of banks leads to more competition and possibly lowers the loan rates. For example, a decrease in the fixed setup costs per bank in Sussman and Zeira (1995) and Harrison, Sussman and Zeira (1999) increases the number of banks, decreases the distance between any two neighboring banks, and decreases the loan rate for each bank -borrower distance combination. 2 On the other hand, competition between more banks may aggravate an adverse selection problem by enabling lower quality borrowers to obtain financing, resulting in moral hazard and credit rationing (Petersen and Rajan (1995) ) or a higher interest rate (Broecker (1990), Cao and Shi (2001) ). In Dell'Ariccia (2001), adverse selection generates an endogenous fixed cost constituting a barrier to entry in the industry limiting the number of banks competing in the market.
A decrease in the fixed cost component of the relationship building technology in Hauswald and Marquez (2000) similarly not only leads to an increase in the number of banks and more competition, but also results in a retrenchment towards relationship lending (as in Boot and Thakor (1999) ). The lower entry barrier then leads to sharper adverse selection problems and higher loan rates for the borrowers closest to the relationship lender but lower loan rates for customers farther away. In effect, loan rates will decrease (increase) more per unit in distance between the borrower and the relationship (transactional) bank.
Distance, Borrower Information, and Experience
Borrowers may not be fully informed about the precise location of all the competitors' branches and the availability and conditions of the loans offered there. For example, Grossman and Shapiro (1984) and Bester and Petrakis (1995) model such location cum informational differentiation. In Grossman and Shapiro (1984) , consumers may buy a product from a particular seller upon becoming informed of its location through advertising. The advertising itself is not localized. The sales price in their model exceeds the full information price, by the magnitude of the transportation cost, as informational differentiation lowers the elasticity of demand. In addition, consumers in their model, as they are unaware of all sellers, may not patronize the closest one. Bester and Petrakis (1995) model the advertising of lower price offers. Absent advertising, customers are only informed about "local" prices. Bester and Petrakis show that firms will advertise lower prices to attract customers from distant locations. Hence, more distant and informed customers may be observed to receive lower prices. Alternatively, consumers may have experienced a good match and observed the high quality of the services provided by the current supplier. Consequently, "experienced" consumers may not switch to a competitor unless offered a considerably lower price and the demand curve will be again less than perfectly elastic (Tirole (1988) , p. 294).
Finally, one should note that the location of the bank branch is just one out of many characteristics of a banking product. One implication of a recent literature modeling product placement decisions in multi -dimensional product spaces is that borrowers not necessarily visit the closest branch when the bank's product exhibits other, more preferred, characteristics (for example, Degryse (1996) or Irmen and Thisse (1998) ).
To conclude, most theoretical models imply no or a negative (positive) correspondence between the borrower-lender (competing bank) distance and the loan rate, while information availability, experience, and other product characteristics may abate the strength of the distanceloan rate relationship. However, as far as we are aware no paper has yet empirically investigated these associations, or lack thereof, directly and comprehensively.
Data
Loan Contracts
We extend a data set detailed in Degryse and Van Cayseele (1998) and employed by Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) . The original data set consists of 17,776 loans given to independents (or single-person businesses), 3 small, medium, and large sized firms by an important
Belgian bank which operates all over Belgium. Around 80% of the firms are single -person businesses (sole proprietorships). Some borrowers take several loans from this bank; the data set covers loans granted to 13,104 borrowers -implying that the average borrower maintained 1.36 loans at that bank at that point in time. The sample commences with all existing loans at the bank as of August 10, 1997 that were initiated after January 1, 1995. Address recording errors, incomplete map coverage, and changes in street names (we have 1995 addresses but the software is using up-to-date maps) cut in our sample. We drop 801 contracts that were either relocated or where the borrower switched to another or a new branch after the closure of their old one. Next, we conservatively remove the 1-% borrowers located farthest from their lending bank, as we discover that a combination of possible address recording errors, mapping problems, and non-standard borrowing motives and business arrangements is responsible for most of these longer distances. 9 Finally, we lay aside 612 contracts located in postal zones without competing banks. We return to this set of contracts later in the paper. 
Distance to Lender
The median borrower is located around 4 minutes and 20 seconds from the lender, which depending on the local road conditions translates into 2.25 kilometers (1.40 miles) of driving at 31 km/h (20 mph). 11 In contrast, Petersen and Rajan (2002) find that the median distance between lending banks and small US firms covered by the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finance (NSSBF) is more than double, i.e. 4 miles. However, the median firm in the NSSBF employs 2 to 4 employees, 12 while the median firm in our sample is a sole proprietorship. 13 In addition, costs of driving may differ substantially between Belgium and the U.S., 14 and Belgian businesses may be limited by the size of the country in their choice of domestically located banks. 15 These arguments may also explain the even larger differences with the other distance statistics Petersen and Rajan (2002) report. For example, the average (75 percentile) borrowerbank distance in our sample is around 3 (3.5) miles, while the same borrower in Petersen and Rajan (2002) communicates across 42.5 (14) miles with her bank or across a whopping 252
(255) miles with her other financial institution(s). Petersen and Rajan (2002) also report that the distance between U.S. borrowers and banks has increased dramatically over time. 16 For example, the median bank -borrower distance has more than doubled between the mid -70s and the early -90s from 2 to 5 miles, while the average distance more than quadrupled from 16 to 68 miles. In contrast, in our sample, the median and average distances between the borrowers and the Belgian bank we study increased by only around 30%, from 4 (6.85) in 1975 to 5.2 (8.86 ) minutes in 1997. 17 In Figure 1 , we display the traveling time statistics for each year, which is calculated by subtracting the duration of the relationship between lender and borrower from the initiation year of each loan contract. In effect, we assume that the address of the borrower didn't change during the relationship period.
The horizontal scale of the figure lists the year and the resulting number of contracts in each year.
The right scale reports the means (dots) plus or minus two standard deviations (thin vertical lines)
of the traveling times in minutes.
Most of the modest increase in traveling time in our sample seems to occur during the early -90s. This increase may be partly driven by the changes in the number of bank branches because of regulatory driven de-specialization of financial intermediation and resulting consolidation. Indeed, Figure 1 (left scale) illustrates the small decrease in the number of branches of all banks during the same period.
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We regress the Distance to Lender on an intercept, the Starting Year of the Relationship, a Large Firm dummy, and an interaction term between the latter two variables. We want to investigate whether technology affects larger firms in a different way than other firms. Distance Possible selection issues may further complicate the assessment of this moderate growth in distance between bank and borrowers ). For example, firms may be poached, 19 and hence may switch banks, more frequently if they are located farther away from a bank branch. Indeed, if we look at the evolution of distance by loan origination date, we find that average distance actually decreases from 7.7 minutes in 1995 to 6.68 minutes in 1997! We are therefore tempted to conclude that our findings with respect to the evolution over time of the lender-borrower distances match a study by Buch (2001) . 20 She reports that in the period 1983 through 1998 distance became less important for international bank lending by U.S. banks, in stark contrast to European banks for which distance remained of the same importance. We will nevertheless control for possible changes over time in lending technology in robustness exercises.
Distance to Closest Competitors
We now turn to our other main variable of interest, distance to the closest competitors.
The me dian (average) borrower in our sample is located 2 (2) minutes from the closest competitor or 3 minutes and 15 (50) seconds from the quartile closest competitor located in the same postal zone. The quartile closest competitor is the bank branch with the 25-percentile traveling time located in the same postal zone as the borrower. We select this second measure as our metric of competitor proximity for obvious measurement reasons. Omissions, recording, or mapping errors are less likely to influence the 25-percentile statistic than the shortest distance statistic. In addition, bank branches may not be entirely homogeneous in their product offerings. In that case, we also conjecture our 25% measure to be more highly correlated with the distance to the closest, "truly" competing bank branch than the minimum distance metric. In any case, we will also check for robustness with respect to this a priori choice of metric of competitor proximity.
The lending bank is located closer than the quartile (closest) competitor in more than 44% (25%) of the borrower contract cases. Hence, distance seems a relevant bank (product) characteristic for a sizeable minority of the borrowers in our data set, though a majority doesn't seem overly constrained by geographical proximity. In less densely branched areas, proximity may play a bigger role. 21 Nevertheless, these statistics suggest that, while distance is important, information, reputation, and other bank characteristics may also determine the choice of lender and loan conditions.
Relationship Characteristics
Relationship characteristics are also central to our analysis in capturing information and experience effects. The first characteristic in this category, Main Bank, indicates whether this bank considers itself as the main-bank of that firm or not. The definition used by the bank to determine whether it is the main -bank is "having a monthly 'turnover' on the current account of at least 100,000 BEF (U.S. Dollar 2,500), and buying at least two products from that bank". More than 50% of all borrowers are classified Main Bank customers. Main Bank captures the scope of the relationship. That is whether this firm also buys other products from this bank and executes most of its payments via this bank. If these sources of information improve the accuracy of the bank's information or reduce the monitoring costs, the measure Main Bank should reduce the expected cost of such loans. 22 But Main Bank may also proxy for the lack of information a borrower has about alternatives. In that case, a main bank customer will pay a higher loan rate, but may be less subject to spatial price discrimination.
The second relationship variable is the Duration of the financial Relationship in years with 13 that particular bank at the time the loan rate is decided upon. A relationship starts when a firm buys for the first time a product from that bank. The average duration of the relationship in the sample is about eight years. Duration may proxy for the increased time for a firm to experience the banks' products and appreciate the added flexibility the bank has to maintain and fulfill implicit contracts. While the bank may gain private information about a firm and tailor its products, the firm may also become locked-in. To conclude, a long-term bank customer may pay a higher loan rate, but may also be less subject to discriminatory pricing.
Competition
Finally, we also enlist in our main analysis the Number of Competitors, which is defined as the number of bank branches (minus the lender's) in the borrower's postal zone. In most of the discussed spatial models, the number of competitors corresponds inversely to the sum of the distance to the lender and the closest competitor. This is also the case in our sample, though the correlation coefficient seems small in absolute value. The correlation coefficient for the Number of
Competitors and the sum of the Distance to Lender and Distance to the quartile (actual) Closest
Competitor for each contract is only -0.023*** (-0.103***).
An obvious candidate to explain the small correlation coefficient is the spatial simplification embedded in theoretical models. Geographical clustering of business and banking activities across a land surface may weaken any correspondence between distance and the number of bank branches. In addition, there are also the differences in surface size of the postal zones. Many postal zones are almost equal in size, a cursory look on the map suggests. However, there are exceptions such as the postal zones in the Capital Brussels (which are small) and the postal zones in the provinces Luxembourg or West-Flanders (which are large). Such differences are most likely related to differences in for example population density, the number of businesses, and other possible criteria the postal system used to zone the country. We include 8 postal area dummies (which cover around 100 zones each) in addition to the base case to control for these differences in zone size. We will also introduce postal zone and bank branch effects in robustness exercises.
Other Variables
The rest of the variables are also discussed at length in Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000), so we limit the write-up here. Consider the loan contract characteristics. The first is the Interest Rate on the loan until the next revision. For fixed interest rate loans, this is the yield to maturity of the loan. For variable interest rate loans, this is the interest rate until the date at which the interest rate will be revised as stipulated in the contract. The average interest rate on a loan in our sample is 8.12% or 812 basis points (we will employ basis points throughout to facilitate tabulation and interpretation of results). The variable rate loans are, after an interest rate revision, treated in the sample as a new observation, with a revised interest rate. Loan fees are not included, but are typically not charged to sole proprietorships and set nationally are unlikely to be determined by any of the local variables of interest.
The median loan size is 300,000 BEF (7,500 USD), but varies between 5,000 and 80,000,000 BEF. We will assume in our empirical analysis that loan rate and size are determined jointly. The variable Collateral indicates whether the loan is collateralized or not. We have no further information on the type of collateral provided. Approximately 26% of the loans are collateralized. We will assume, as in for example Berger and Udell (1995) , Harhoff and Körting (1998) , and Elsas and Krahnen (1998) among others, that collateral and interest rate conditions are determined sequentially, with the collateral decision preceding the interest rate determination.
Collateral is often pledged at the beginning of a relationship, only infrequently and/or inconsistently adjusted, and may end up covering multiple loans. However, we will investigate alternative decision sequences with respect to loan size and collateral in robustness checks.
Another loan contract characteristic is the Repayment Duration of the Loan. For all loans to the firms, we know at what 'speed' the loans are repaid. This allows us to compute the exact repayment duration of a loan. We include the natural logarithm of this variable in the regression analysis in order to proxy for the risk associated with the time until the loan is repaid. We also include dummies capturing the type of loan the firm is taking. We have five types of loans in our sample. For bank -strategic considerations, we cannot reveal the relative importance of the types of loans. Hence, the types of loans are included in Table 3 for convenient reference, but we cannot report statistics. The distinction is made between Business Mortgage, Bridging Finance, Prepay Taxes, Business Term, and Consumer Credit loans. The size of most loans is rather small, since a large part of our loans are of Prepay Taxes and Consumer Credit type. We also include a Rollover dummy, which takes a value of one if the loan is given to prepay another loan, and is zero otherwise. Four dummies capture the effect of the revisability of the loan.
The firm characteristics include both proxies for the size and legal form of the firm. We distinguish between Sole Proprietorships (82.99% of the sample), Small (15.98%), Medium (0.89%), and Large (0.14%) Firms, and between Sole Proprietorships, Limited Partnerships (11.97%), Limited Partnerships with Equal Sharing (1.17%), Corporations (3.78%), and temporary Bridge Arrangements (0.09%). We exclude the dummy for Sole Proprietorships. The inclusion of 49 two-digit NACE code dummies captures the industry characteristics. 23 The interest rate variables are incorporated to control for the underlying cost of capital in the economy. We control for variations in the cost of capital by including four variables. The first is the interest rate on a Belgian Government Security with the same repayment duration as the loan granted to the firm. We calculate this interest rate using the exact date of granting the loan to the firm. Secondly, we include a Term Spread, defined as the difference between the yield on a government bond with repayment duration of five years and the yield on a 3-months Belgian
Treasury bill. Finally, we incorporate two year dummies (1995 is the base case) to control for business cycle effe cts.
Empirical results
Regression Analysis
This section analyzes the empirical results of the determinants of the loan rate. We analyze the determinants of the loan rate by regressing the loan interest rate on our distance, relationship characteristics, competition, and control variables (which are loan contract and firm characteristics and interest rates) using the ordinary least squares estimation technique. We focus on the distance, relationship, and competition variables. We first discuss a start-up specification.
Afterwards, we add our competition and distance variables of interest, and perform supplementary robustness tests.
First, we regress the loan interest rate (in basis points) on the relationship characteristics and control variables. This specification merely replicates an exercise by Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) for a slightly different sample including also the large firms. 24 Most coefficients remain virtually unaltered, both as a departure from Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) and throughout our exercises in this paper; hence we therefore only briefly discuss, but do not tabulate, the estimated coefficients.
The loan contract characteristics include whether the loan is collateralized, the repayment duration of the loan, and loan type and goal. The coefficient of Collateral indicates that when a loan is collateralized, the loan rate decreases by approximately 51*** basis points. 25 This result seems in line with the sorting-by-private -information paradigm, which predicts that safer borrowers pledge more collateral (for example, Berger and Udell (1990) and Besanko and Thakor (1987) ). However, it contrasts with results by for example Elsas and Krahnen (1998) and Machauer and Weber (1998) Finally, a significant fraction of the variation in the loan rate is explained by economy-wide factors. The change in the loan rate due to a one basis point change in the interest rate on a Government Security with the same repayment duration equals 0.5***. A one basis point parallel shift of the Term Spread implies a positive 0.4*** basis point shift in the loan rate. The size of the coefficient on the government security variable found by Petersen and Rajan (1994) is around 0.3*** whereas the one for the term spread is negative and insignificant. Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) reported a somewhat higher coefficient on their government security variable (0.7***), but a somewhat lower term spread coefficient (0.3***).
Relationship Characteristics
We now report the empirical results concerning the role of relationships. These variables play a more prominent role in our analysis of the impact of distance on loan conditions. We capture the role of the bank-firm relationship in two complementary ways. Our first indicator of relationship strength, Main Bank, measures the scope of the bank-firm relationship. The loan rate is decreasing in the scope of the relationship. The results show that a firm pays 41*** basis points less when the scope of a relationship is sufficiently broad. 26 The second indicator is the Duration of the Relationship between the lending bank and the borrower. We take the log of the Duration of the Relationship as we expect the marginal impact on the loan rate to decrease in the duration of the financial relatio nship. The coefficient is significantly positive, around 19***, implying that the loan rate increases in the duration of the relationship, as in Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) . An increase in duration from say 7.5
(median) to 13 (median plus one standard deviation) years increases the loan rate by around 10 basis points.
Competition
We incorporate in Models I, II, and III both our measures of banking competition (and the resulting market power of the lending bank) and geographical distance. Table 5 presents the results. We first discuss the competition measures. In line with the discussed spatial models, we start by employing the Number of bank branches of the Competitors operating in the postal zone where the borrower is located. We add the natural log of one plus this number to the regression, and report the results in Model I. The coefficient on ln(Number of Competitors) is not significantly different from zero, suggesting that in our sample neither the effects of induced competition nor adverse selection effects seem to dominate, when competition is measured by the number of bank branches present in the same postal zone of the borrower.
Next, we add the number of bank branches of competitors in adjacent postal zones to this variabl e, as the delineation of postal zones may not correspond to the relevant geographical clustering of banking activities (for example, the capital Brussels covers more than a dozen postal zones). The coefficient on the adjusted variable is not significant either, and we choose not to report the results.
In Model II, we replace the number of competitors by a more commonly used measure of competition, i.e., the Herfindahl -Hirschman Index (HHI). We resort to using the number of bank branches of each bank in the postal zone to construct market shares. In effect, we assume coordination occurs between branches of the same bank, while our previous measure of competition assumed branch independence. 27 The resulting coefficient on the HHI equals a significant, but small, 35.3**. This estimate implies that an increase of 0.1 in the HHI, say from a competitive (HHI < 0.1) to a "highly concentrated" (HHI > 0.18) market, 28 would increase the loan rate by only 3.5 basis points (removing the two distance variables does not alter this finding). Finally, we replace the postal zone effects by bank branch effects to capture branch specific variation in competition and/or spatial variation. Again, random effects seem preferred and the estimated coefficients are very similar. We choose not to report the results.
Distance
We now turn to our distance variables of interest. We take the log of both distance measures, ln(Distance to Closest Competitors) and ln(Distance to Lender), as we conjecture the marginal impact on the loan rate to decrease (in absolute value) in distance. We will alter the choice of functional form in a robustness exercise. The positive and significant coefficients on ln(Distance to Closest Competitors) in Models I, II, and III suggest that borrowers located farther away from competing bank branches face a higher loan rate at the lending bank. These results are consistent with price discrimination resulting from transportation costs, monitoring costs, as well as asymmetric information. Moreover, our proxy for the distance between the borrower and the closest competitor may identify strategic behavior between banks, which our other competition variables did not (or only partly) pick up. Indeed, even after controlling for the number of competitors, branch concentration, postal zone -, and bank branch -effects, the lending bank seems to enjoy substantial market power that increases in the distance to the closest competitors.
In addition, this market power decreases in the distance between the borrower and the lender itself, as indicated by the negative and significant coefficient on the variable ln(Distance to Lender).
The location models discussed in section 2 provide precise theoretical predictions concerning the sum of the coefficients on both distance measures. In particular, given the locations of bank branches, a marginal shift in the location of the borrower implies that the sum of the coefficients on both distance measures should equal zero. Therefore, in line with this theoretical prediction emanating from simple location models, we restrict in Model II the sum of the coefficients on both distance measures to equal zero. We test the restriction and report the results in Model IV. The F-statistic equals 8.6 and hence we cannot reject the equality restriction.
Both distance effects are not only statistically but also economically relevant. Using the estimates of Model IV, for example, an increase of one standard deviation in the distance between borrower and lender, i.e., the traveling time increasing from 0 to 7.3 minutes, decreases the loan rate by 18 basis points. An increase of one standard deviation in the distance between borrower and the closest competitors (from 0 to 2.3 minutes) increases the loan rate by about 10 basis points.
For the median loan of 300,000 BEF, annual outlays for the borrower decrease by 72 BEF (1.8 USD) per extra minute of traveling to the lender. 30 Belgian entrepreneurs and (bank) managers made around 20 BEF / minute in 1995, 31 while the operating costs for a car (gas, maintenance, tires) may have amounted to around 3 BEF / minute of driving. 32 Hence, according to a linear transportation cost model the median borrower is expected to make one -and-a-half additional round -trips to his bank branch as a direct result of the new loan. Alternatively, according to a linear monitoring cost model, bank managers are expected to make three roundtrip visits to their median borrowers. We find these estimates reasonable, given that for example loan repayment can be organized by mail, but economically interesting on the margin.
Relationship Characteristics and Distance
The lending bank in our study does not seem to practice uniform loan pricing. On the contrary, borrowers located closer to the lender and farther away from competitors incur higher loan rates. We also observe that an increase in the distance between borrower and lender decreases the loan rate by a similar amount than a decrease in the distance between borrower and the closest competitors.
Motivated by papers employing not only location but also informational arguments, we interact the two distance measures with the bank -firm relationship variables in Model V. The results are very interesting. The distance coefficients (as such) now capture the impact of distance for "transactional borrowers" (Main Bank = 0 and Duration = 0). The restricted coefficients from this regression (which equal minus and plus 14.2***) suggest that a transactional borrower in our sample expects to visit his branch two-and -a-half times per year as a result of a new 300,000
BEF loan (according to a linear transportation model), one time more than the median borrower.
Remember that in Hauswald and Marquez (2000) , the uninformed (transactiona l) lenders charge a higher loan rate to remote borrowers to compensate for the adverse selection problem which intensifies in the vicinity of informed (relationship) lenders. However, our results suggest that the magnitude of the adverse selection problem does not increase in distance, i.e. the coefficient on the Distance to Lender variable is significantly negative (this result is independent of the restriction, which can not be rejected in the first place). One possible interpretation is that the loans we observe are transactional "all-around", i.e. the lending bank can infer that no alternative lender in the vicinity of the borrower is informed about the borrower either. Alternatively, nonmain bank customers may be attracted by the advertisements of lower prices by the lender, resulting in the observed negative correspondence between distance and loan rate (Bester and Petrakis (1984)) Main Bank customers, on the other hand, seem shielded from discriminatory loan pricing, as we cannot reject the joint equality to zero of the sum of the coefficients on the distance measures and the respective interaction terms with the Main Bank variable (F = 0.156).
Remember that a main bank borrower buys at least two products from the same bank and has a turnover on the current account at that same bank of at least 100,000 BEF per month. Hence, main bank borrowers may face price discrimination on other products and/or be less informed about alternative banks, their products, and prices. However, main bank customers also pay a lower loan rate in our sample. The latter result is not compatible in a location cum information model with the main bank borrowers being less informed. However, the lower loan rate may be caused by cross-subsidization between loans and other banking products. The duration of the relationship between borrower and bank has an insignificant effect on the harshness of price discrimination.
To conclude, broadly in line with theories incorporating asymmetric information, we find that transactional borrowers pay higher interest rates. However, the degree of adverse selection itself does not increase in geographical distance, as "transactional" borrowers seem more affected by spatial price discrimination than less informed "relationship" borrowers.
Robustness Checks
We subject the results reported in Table 5 to a battery of robustness checks. First, we revisit our a priori choices regarding our distance measures. We rerun all models employing traveling times in levels (rather than logs). Results are mostly unaffected. For example, in Model III the coefficient on ln(Distance to Lender) equals -1.1***, implying a decrease in the annual outlays for the median borrower of 33 BEF per extra minute of traveling to the lender. In addition, we cannot reject the equality restrictions in either Models IV or V.
We also replace the Distance to Closest Competitors, i.e. the 25-percentile measure, by the (possibly more noisy) Distance to the actual Closest Competitor in all specifications discussed so far. We report the coefficients for the representative Models III, IV, and V in Appendix B with the label "actual", but do not tabulate standard errors to conserve space. As can be seen from the table, coefficients are unaffected both in sign and magnitude, though (not unexpectedly) significance levels are somewhat higher. We also replace traveling time by physical distance in all specifications and again report the three models in Appendix B, labeled "physical". Remember that based on our calculations physical distance may well be less indicative as a measure of transportation costs. Nevertheless, while the coefficients decrease somewhat in size (for longer trips physical distance exceeds traveling time in minutes), signs and significance levels are broadly unaffected.
We remain concerned that technological developments and/or the location of competitors determine the choice of lender, partly driving our results rather than for example spatial price discrimination. Hence, we add the Starting Year of the Relationship (assuming technology progresses linearly through time) and the (national) Number of Branches to all models. Even though ln(Duration of Relationship) and Starting Year are by construction almost interchangeable and highly correlated (-0.91), both coefficients are significant. For example in Model IV, the coefficients are respectively 55.4*** and 4.5***. The coefficient on the Number of Branches is insignificant. However more importantly, the results for the distance coefficients of interest in all discussed models remain virtually unaltered. We are therefore led to conclude that technological developments may not be a major issue when interpreting our results.
Loan size is exogenous in most location models. Nevertheless, we introduce Loan Size in the specifications assuming a sequential decision process of size followed by rate. We report the results in Table 6 . We focus on the equivalent of Model IV in Table 5 , as its parsimony and efficiency will be needed in subsequent sub sample exercises (the other specifications yield similar results). The coefficient on Loan Size equals -12.3***, indicating that an increase in loan size from the median (0.3 mln. BEF) to the mean (0.88 mln. BEF) amount decreases the interest rate by 7 basis points. The other coefficients remain unaltered and we cannot reject the equality restriction involving the distance coefficients.
Next, we aim to recognize the possible interdependence between loan size, rate, and distance. Loan size and rate may be determined jointly. In addition, the impact of distance on the loan rate may decrease in loan size (and possible even duration), due to the fixed cost character of the incurred transportation costs. Rather than estimating an ad-hoc system, we opt for stratifying the sample by loan size, with cut-offs set at 0.2 and 2 mln. BEF. Reduced sample size leads us to suppress loan contract and firm characteristics. We report all relevant coefficients by size category in Table 6 . The coefficients decrease by loan size, but remain significant for the two categories containing the smallest loans. We can also not reject the equality restriction of the distance coefficients in either one of the size categories. In addition, though the coefficients decrease, the outlays per minute of extra traveling are quite similar. For example, for the median loan sizes in each group (i.e., 109,000 BEF; 500,001 BEF; and 3,105,000 BEF), a minute of extra traveling costs 47, 58, and 63 BEF respectively.
In a similar spirit, we drop the Collateral dummy from the specifications and in addition study the sets of contracts with and without collateral separately. Dropping Collateral hardly affects our main results. To run all specifications on the subsets of contracts we drop loan contract and firm characteristics. Distance continues to play a large role in the pricing of the 11,073 contracts without collateral. For example, the distance coefficients in Model IV equal minus and plus 18.5*** respectively. On the other hand, for the 3,971 collateralized contracts the distance coefficients drop to -/+ 2.7, with a standard deviation of 2.0 no longer significant at conventional levels. However, we can still not reject the equality restriction.
We are also concerned that firm characteristics such as firm size or legal status may determine distance. Hence, we restrict the sample to sole proprietorships. We are left with 12,360 observations and report the results in the last but one column of Table 6 . The coefficients on all measures of interest remain broadly unaltered. We further randomly select one loan per firm (from the 15,044 observations) to reduce the impact of those (possibly larger) firms subscribing to multiple contracts. Nonetheless, the results for the remaining 11,222 loans are very similar to the results reported in Table 5 .
Firms located in one of the 149 postal zones bordering other countries (the Netherlands, Germany, Luxembourg, and France) may face additional constraints in finding an alternative Belgian bank. However, our results remain also robust to dropping the 1,744 contracts located in those postal zones.
Finally, we match loan contracts to BelFirst, a data set containing yearly balance and profit/loss statements of more than 250,000 Belgian corporations. Quite a few sole proprietorships seem not listed in BelFirst. Conservatively matching on tax identification numbers, we track 1,058 firms. The summary statistics of this matched sample are surprisingly similar to the statistics for the entire data set. We employ accounting data from the year preceding the loan contract. To parsimoniously control for firm risk and funding needs, we insert as explanatory variables firm Assets and the ratios of Earnings, Short Term Debt, and Net Trade
Credit over Assets. We find that smaller, less profitable, and firms that are more indebted pay a higher loan rate. The distance coefficients increase in absolute value to 25.9**, but are also estimated much less precisely (the standard deviation on the coefficient increases to 10.3). Again, we cannot reject the equality restriction on our distance measures at a 5%-level of significance.
Excluding the four newly introduced variables does not alter the estimated parameters of our other variables. We also collect firm age for 896 out of the 1,058 firms. Adding ln(Firm Age) as a fifth firm variable causes the distance coefficients to decrease in absolute value to 17.6* (the standard deviation equals 10.5).
Finally, we return to the 612 contracts located in postal zones without any identified bank branches. We add these contracts to the sample bringing the number of observations to 15,656.
We calculate the Distance to the Lender for each of these additional contracts, but we set their Distance to the Closest Competitors equal to zero. We add a dummy (which equals one for each of the 612 contracts, and zero otherwise) to account for the undetermined effect of distance. We rerun all models. The coefficient on the dummy in the postal zone effects model, for example, equals 39.5*** (with a standard deviation of 13. 
Conclusions
We directly study the effect on loan conditions of the geographical distance between firms, the lending bank, and all other banks in the vicinity. We report, as far as we are aware, the first comprehensive evidence of the occurrence of spatial price discrimination in bank lending.
Borrowing costs decrease in the distance between the firm and the lender and increase at the same rate in the distance between the firm and competing banks. Both effects are statistically significant and economically relevant. The results are robust to various changes in model specifications and variable definitions and seem not induced by the at best modest changes in lending technology that we infer. The observed stability of the Belgian bank branch system during the sample years allows us to interpret the coefficients of the simple reduced form specifications within the framework of static models explaining spatial price discrimination.
Loan rates may reflect both distance as well as information effects. Transactional borrowers, obtaining their only product from the bank, seem subject to the harshest discriminatory pricing. However, as borrowers start using the lending bank more broadly, spatial price discrimination seems to relax as if borrowers become less informed about alternatives. We find no direct evidence of adverse selection increasing in distance, though it is possible that most borrowers we classify as transactional are known to be new to all banks in the vicinity.
Overall, the results suggest that local loan officers seemingly price loans by location, though distance variables are not featured in their formally acknowledged credit scoring system.
Stein (2002) provides a rationale for why local officers may optimally be granted such leeway in assessing and pricing local loan applications. In addition, Brunner, Krahnen and Weber (2000) provide preliminary empirical evidence (for Germany) of the importance of soft, qualitative factors in the determination of internal bank ratings (and hence loan rates).
If banks persist in pricing loans by location, brick-and -mortar branching may remain vital in ensuring access to credit at reasonable rates, in particular for small firms and entrepreneurs.
While technological developments in communication and travel may ultimately diminish the relevance of distance, we find only minor traces of such developments in our sample (which envelops the 1975-1997 period). The latter result could suggest that presaging "the Death of
Distance" might remain a bit premature in a European banking context. (5) 1 Source: The number of observations is 15044. *, **, and *** = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, using Pearson-correlation. Notes. The dependent variable is the Loan Rate until next revision, in basis points. We employ ordinary least squares estimation. *, **, and *** = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, two-tailed. The definition of the variables can be found in Table 3 . Ln(.) are the natural log of one plus the respective variables.
a In millions of BEF . Notes. The dependent variable is the Loan Rate until next revision, in %. The number of observations is 15044. We employ ordinary least squares estimation. *, **, and *** = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, two-tailed. In Models labeled "actual", the Distance to the actual (not 25%) Closest Competitor is used. In Models "physical", the fastest physical distance (not traveling time) is used. The definition of the other variables can be found in Table 3 
